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Being and Becoming of Music: Limits of Thought and Practice

Nikola Vasilijević ⓘ
Department of musicology, Faculty of Linguistics, Cultures, and Arts
Goethe Univeristy, Frankfurt am Main
vasilijevich.nikola@gmail.com

Abstract

According to musicologist Christopher Small, the treatment of music in musicology carries fundamentally flawed historical premises. Instead of focusing on music through art „objects", anything understood *as* „music" should be examined on the grounds of its spatiotemporal appearance, as a social activity of *musicking* and the unfolding *event*. The emphasis of the verb „musicking" instead of the substantive „music" signifies a reinterpretation of a static into a processual concept. According to Small, musical meaning is formed with regards to the time and space of the immersive situation and the bodily encounter of participating individuals. This processual intervention over existing musical concepts through reinterpretation as „musicking" opens the door to a broader philosophical scope. In order to approach two seemingly opposed interpretations of the subject matter mentioned above, I will attempt a reinterpretation of Small with reference to Arthur Schopenhauer's concept of the „Will", but with a more detailed emphasis on the expanded principle of the „Dyonisian" and „Apollonian" as suggested by Friedrich Nietzsche. I will further suggest some criteria for interpretation of any potential „musicking" through several points of contention between Small's musicology and Nietzsche's philosophy. For this, I will utilize Nietzsche's philosophical opposition between *Being* and *Becoming* serving as foundations of knowledge and art. The suggestion is that, while the entanglement of the Apollonian „image" and the Dyonisian „rush" enables the emergence of music as art, the foundation of Small's „musicking" lies in the non-ethical character of the Dyonisian—in what lies „behind" the phenomenon and conceptualization of it. This ultimately questions the implication of music „as" art, as it suggests that any justification

thereof can not be considered outside of the subjective disposition encountering the event, nor beyond the individual disposition emerging within it. „Musicking" doesn't emerge with any cultural, social, symbolic or teleological purpose, but attains any one of these as soon as it's designated „as-such" by those principles that enable the concept to emerge in the first place. This, despite its broadly influential treatise, ultimately reveals the limits of Small's „musicking".

Keywords: musicking, event, tragedy, processuality, aesthetics

1. Introduction

The musicologist Christopher Small understands the term „music" as problematic due to the vast variety of practices that underlie its meaningful organization of sound. However, for Small, it is both heterogenous and ephemeral in character—it finishes as soon as the action of its organizing is terminated. Music does not exist without the organizing activity, as it is first and foremost „something people do" (Small, 1998, p. 2). The priorization by the West of historical „works" generated a shift from the subject of music as experience and practice to that of an objective, rationalized category (Small, 1998, p. 4-5). Thus, through a linguistic reformulation, „musicking" lies at the very foundation of processuality designated by human participation. During musicking, those engaged in the event are bound by a common, shared processuality: as a social activity within familiar circumstances. Simultaneously, the process of musicking is exclusive of those outside of its reach, but inherently inclusive of those within its boundaries. The immediacy of the activity of musicking is corporeal, and its requirement is one of spatiotemporal presence „of" music, something that in its form of appearance alone continuously evades a totalizing account.

The inherent duality of the conceptual and the attempted processual overlook on music is often the point of criticism in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, in particular with regards to his own music philosophy. In his *Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche develops the mutually dependent impulses of the „Apollonian" and the „Dyonisian" as cultural drives of Ancient Greece, both of which are responsible for the emergence of the art form of the Greek Tragedy. Conventionally, the dualism is emphasized somewhat inadequately with the Apollonian being understood as the formal and rationalizing principle, with the Dyonisian stands for the inarticulated, „chaotic" background of all art.

To explore the divergent notions of how we understand music in conceptual and processual terms, I will loosely utilize the philosophical notions of Being and Becoming. Being here acts as an association to „static" concepts, inherent in both the language of everyday use, as well as the epistemological criteria applied to one or more particular kinds of „music"; Becoming touches on the

nature of both the conceptual elusiveness of the musical phenomenon, as much as it places the processual and situational form of existence in the foreground. Both open the door to separating interpretations of the same subject matter: on the one hand, a conceptualizing impulse, and on the other a critical drive of doubt and reevaluation. Whereas Being relates to available discursive tools for any articulation at all, the Becoming accounts for its contingent, unpre-dictable and uncontrollable nature that continuously evades inter-pretation. Similar descriptions in aesthetic and philosophical theories of the West have contributed to the premise of impossibility with avoiding mediation in reference to music; yet, even those reflect the already existing paradigms related to music. In other words: we cannot acquire any deeper access to what we do not know, unless we radically suspend with what we do know.

2. Musicking and processuality

In questioning the limits of the concept of „music" in the introductory chapter to his book „Musicking", the suspicion of Small focuses on imposed criteria not always adequately justifiable in practice. According to Small, the underlying premise, characteristic of Western musical practices and the discourse in musicology lies in the implicit understanding of music through artistic „objects" or „works" of art (Small, 1998, p. 3). Despite Small's emphasis on practice itself instead of „work" objects (Small, 1998, p. 8), one could read this argument in a circular manner: what we consider to be „music" is determined through reference to works, along with works being required to fulfill certain criteria in order to „be" as music. It would follow then that, without clearly explicable „works" as points of reference, there would be no music to speak of; concurrently, with no clear idea of music, an abstraction such as a work would not be required.

In addition to a somewhat generalized postcolonial criticism of western musicology and its historical self-prioritization, the issue that Small puts forward can be read as an epistemological and a philosophical one. The epistemological one would go as follows: in treating music through conjunctive objects, musicology faces a risk of imposing one such concept on practices that know nothing of it. Even if some cultural space outside of the West produced objects that, upon translation, refer to e.g. „songs", the likelihood of those „songs" inherently belonging to the same kind of „objects" as songs in the West is doubtful. For example, in native-american musical practices, „songs" will prove to be far more determined by their practical use and its related historical role (Nettl, 1974), making any object-based analysis problematic. In always necessarily referring to a „work", contexts and presuppositions are applied as an interpretational lens interfering with the adequacy of the musical phenomenon. A scientific discourse would always require a sufficient and necessary amount of knowledge in order to treat anything as its object of

study—yet the problem is whether the form of knowledge required is itself one adequate to the object of study. Such an implicitly dogmatic perspective, Small continues, ultimately leads to a canonization of important „works“ and artists, both of which become self-evident paradigmatic examples of particular historical contexts (Small, 1998, p. 3). The criteria that allow for such a canonization are potentially imposed, not inferred from the object of study. Consequentially, the focus shifts from the study of practice to the imposed canon of music, historically and stylistically listened to in a certain way in direct dependence from its narrative and practical understanding[1]. An imposition of any scientific approach might in fact impose a context as a form of interpretation. Suspending with the canonical, western, musicological premises with the introduction of the „Other“ does not necessarily challenge the premises themselves adequately, but aims to critically reintroduce them through different contexts. Small was not the first one to point to problems of these premises, as challenging these practical and methodological biases has been the driving force and the foundation for the development of ethnomusicology (Bohlmann, 1992).

I would however like to point to the second issue raised by Small, namely the philosophical aspect. In addition to its being imposed, the „work“ concept positions music into a hierarchical order with the purpose of *representation* or *mediation* of something beyond itself. We never listen to music directly, but engage with something abstract through it (be it ideas, beauty, emotions, nature etc.)—music reveals the well known or familiar structures outside of its own self. Through representation, the „work“ is positioned into a metaphysical realm where any direct encounter of it is impossible without a mediation that itself lies beyond the music experienced. Music is, according to Small, wrongly displaced into a domain of incomprehensible abstractions and, in order to be evaluated at all, needs to be made understandable, articulable—it needs to „mean“ something (Small, 1998, p. 4).

Small denounces this with the following argument: music may or may not mean something, because, outside of the experience and the one experiencing it, there is no requirement for it to mean anything whatsoever. In addition, it should not to be treated as an object or „work“ or even an autonomous cultural concept because, beyond its ephemeral spatiotemporal emergence, it simply *does not exist* (Small, 1998, pp. 7-8). Small proposes a radical dissolution from any object of knowledge by bypassing the „static“ concept alltogether; by understanding music, not through works, but as an artistic *activity*. He suggests a linguistic intervention of reformulating the substantive *music* into the verb *musicking*, implying that any static Being of music disregards its implicitly processual Becoming essential to all musical activity. Musicking hence desig-

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[1] For more on the history of relationship between the practice of listening and musical works, see: Zorn (2021).

nates a processual situation in which individuals are, in one way or the other, immersed into a participative *event* where music happens. It encompasses more than the standard division into composers, performers and the audience, but also accounts for organizers, ticket-checkers, the cleaning personel etc. (Small, 1998, p. 10); it involves activities as dancing, singing, listening to the walkman, even the „aimless whistling" by Dahlhaus[2]; musicking includes any single person that makes the event of musicking possible.

This radical reconceptualization immediately raises questions concerning specificity: when exactly does „musicking" begin? Upon the emergence of the first note or already during preparations for the event? Furthermore, for whom? For the person in the audience, it may begin the moment the first tones are played on stage; or upon entering the concert hall; or upon leaving home and heading to the concert; or already with the „mental" engagement of buying the ticket. Yet, for the person performing, it might begin with the first tone as much as with the opening applause or the first rehearsal session; or practicing for the rehearsal—or even with the first music lesson as a child. Moreover, the incorporation of other „non-musical" individuals as ticket-checkers or the cleaning staff significantly multiplies the number of possible perspectives. In shifting the focus from the formal elements of the „work", Small has expanded the contextual basis of the musical event into a far broader ontological domain. Were we to take such a radically pluralistic proposition to the end, we might even argue that everyone with such an inherent capacity perpetually does „musicking", with the difference being that of gradation—of „more" or „less"[3]. What still remains unclear is the criterium of „more" or „less". What traditionally applies to a conscious musical activity, both on the reception and performance end, now risks becoming secondary, an induced concept not possessing, but arising out of a musical potentiality. The fluctuating nature of musical Becoming goes on indefinitely, and every instantiation of its specificity arises as a distinct form of Being. Music is not only an event of *one* possible objective or absolute Becoming, but primarily a participative event where anyone taking part adds to the emerging event. It thus has, not one Being—but multiple, related to every contributing individual. Small's attempt is one of a radical dissolution from the ideal concept of „music" and to instead refer to it while or as it is happening.

Small's musicking event should be understood as a participative framework of activity for the purpose of criticizing our own observation. The mediating character of sound is determined by the common quality of its existence „as music" by emerging out of the possibility of sound; it is up to us to criticize the determination of „as music". Small's musical and sonic materialism is, as the activity itself, embedded in there being sound produced by present people.

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[2] Understood as insufficiently sophisticated to be considered music in: Dahlhaus (1982, p. 77).
[3] "And the musicians—anyone and anything that sounds!" (Schafer, 1993, p. 5).

Even if it may not be entirely clear as to how we are to establish one such framework of sounding participation, its fluidity is purposefully emphasized to bypass potential dogmatic obstructions. Even Small himself was well aware of the difficulty he engaged with, yet willingly undertook it due to what he understood as a systematic neglect of musicology and its tendency to make up conclusions, instead of observe (Small, 1998, pp. 13-14).

3. The art of musicking

Similarly to Small, participation or artistic activity establishes the underlying foundation of Friedrich Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*. In focusing on the Greek Tragedy and the roles of different participants, as well as the drive that charges the artistic situation, Nietzsche attempts to extrapolate a broader principle of relationship between existence, art and culture. Although within the domain of cultural criticism and philosophy of art, Nietzsche's emphasis accents the impulsive emergence of tragedy, the momentary phenomenon out of which art emerges. For this, he employs and expands upon the metaphysics of Arthur Schopenhauer that will require a brief summarization before returning to Nietzsche. It will also assist in linking the Being and Becoming more closely to the issues of music and musicking that resonate throughout both Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's metaphysics, but also in their respective aesthetics of music.

Arthur Schopenhauer understands the *Will* as the incomprehensible principle of existence, a perpetually fluctuating driving force of reality (Young, 1994). Unattainable directly and avoiding any genuine representation, it is the more ontologically dynamic notion of the Kantian „noumenon", of that which perpetually evades categories, forms and concepts. The attaining of forms with relation to human experience of the world emerges through the „Principle of individuation" (*principium individuationis)*, with individuations being comprehensive iterations into distinct entities; be it to objects, ideas, the Self even—anything that accounts for a distinct „that". If the Will as a driving force of reality is itself elusive, it is due to our innate subjective capacity of observing and comprehending the world only through forms and individuations that, when attained in comprehensive and meaningful form, emerge as *Representations*. Yet for Schopenhauer, although music lies outside of representations and individuations, it is nonetheless only comprehensible through them; music itself appears as an abstracted form. Schopenhauer understands music as being the closest possible to the Will itself (Schopenhauer, 1993), lying somewhere in the indetermined delineation between the Will and Representation. Despite the association here being the representational requirement of language and words as symbolic associations of music (mostly brought into connection with so-called „absolute music"), this is a limiting reading. For our subject, a more beneficial understanding would be in the direction of potent-

iality, with the Will residing in the fluxus of „noise" or „background", in the pure potentiality out of which any individuation (even one such as music) might emerge[4].

It is worth mentioning that Schopenhauer's view of music predominantly focuses on aesthetic reception. The aesthetic situation intervenes upon the appearance of things and presents them as different than they usually are; hence, what normally appears as something of interest is relieved of it when encountered aesthetically. The subject becomes „disinterested" and the perceived aesthetic object one of „disinterested contemplation" (Schopenhauer, 1993). In being rid of the interest and dread that life brings, the consciousness becomes seemingly devoid of objectivity (Young, 1994). This aesthetic consciousness is, for Schopenhauer, a gradation of cognition in relation to anything perceived. Anything may be perceived aesthetically, but such profound objectivity is reserved only for art. There is thus no „good" or „bad" art, but rather „art or no art at all" (Young, 1994).

Art is differently situated by Nietzsche. Even though somewhat appropriating Schopenhauers Will, the focus of Nietzsche's implementation of it emphasises the participant who *encounters* art, both actively and inactively with both the encountering consciousness and the „art" emerging out of the same impulse. The two cannot be separated, as one doesn't truly exist without the other. It might be understood as one „artistic" instead of an „aesthetic" approach (Reginster, 2014), disqualifying a detached perception in an assumed dualistic relation of subject-object to the art work. Furthermore, the aesthetic consciousness cannot emerge as in any true way objective when perceiving something aesthetically, as it is *always* objective—the Self is its antagonist (Young, 1994). Images and significance in relation to any individuation present themselves in forms available for repeated recognition by the participating subject, presenting a foundation for the possibility of repetition, for which a formal component of the subject and culture is always a common one. Nietzsche characterizes this as the *Apollonian*, a formalizing principle within a culture or, in a broader sense—a drive for and towards the principle of individuation.

Due to its abstract nature however, music doesn't mediate or copy anything, but exists by „complementing of everything physical in the world by what is metaphysical" (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 77). As an appearance of contingency within the known and the familiar, it precedes the idea of itself (Silk & Stern, 1983). Music is thus not placed in the realm of static or contemplative art, but is positioned in a level preceding any individuation of its own self „as" music. The *Dyonisian* thus emerges by communicating the ontologically chaotic consciousness (Young, 1994), preceding individuations both in terms of their separation into comprehensible entities, as well as emerging as distinct from

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[4] An ontological reading of the „Will" grounded in sonic materialism was presented by Christoph Cox (2019).

one another—it precedes both identity and difference. In one such a mode of existence or „state", the individuating subject *dissolves* itself, merging his own self with the participating community intoxicated by an experience of „ecstasy" (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 81). Through this, the principle of individuation is anulled and reverted back into the natural order of the „primordial unity" (Nietzsche, 1999, pp. 18; Silk & Stern, 1983, p. 85). While participating in the tragedy, the form of our habitual existence, the instantiations of Being in the world blend in with the primordial nature of the situation encountered.

Though the two are related to the drive associated with a general emergence of art, an adequate understanding of the artistic creation might still prove as elusive due to a supposed dualism of the Apollonian and Dyonisian. Here, it is worth mentioning that Nietzsche does not treat the two drives as distinct from one another, but as mutually coexisting, regardless of the embodied artistic renditions[5]. The Apollonian and the Dyonisian are reconciled through a kind of dialectical tension: the „Will-full" Dyonisian utterances of nature attain comprehensibility through balance and form of the Apollonian that provides an image to the „unimaginable". It is through the Apollonian form that the Dyonisian ecstasy may be experienced „as" art in the first place through a dissolution into „one-ness as the genius of humankind" (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 21). Nietztsche specifically quotes the Friedrich Schiller's description of the „musical mood" that precedes the event of an idea[6], one that enables an immersion into an artistic phenomenon (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 30). Thus, the Dyonisian attains shape and meaning through the Apollonian appearance, but not as a mediated abstraction, but the very form in which the Dyonisian may emerge in the first place. Simultaneously, the Apollonian cannot be abstracted nor can it emerge autonomously disregarding the Dyonisian drive of „intoxication" (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 70), as it would then divert into a *rational* or „socratic" art[7], ultimately degrading the drive of the Dyonisian by producing art rationally, as artistic objects of critique (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 88).

Nietzsche maintains that art gradually became an object of critique due to it's pertaining to the ideal socratic „truth" (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 55). Yet, as we have seen, the nature of the Dyonisian tragedy inherently dismantles and discredits any rational principle that seeks to define, criticize or explain art. The central point to art phenomena is their requisite of being experienced as „play"

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[5] An example given by Nietzsche is the comparison between the Sophoclean and Aeschylian outlooks on the nature of duality of men and gods and its thematizing in their tragedies (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 131).

[6] "In my case the feeling is initially without a definite and clear object; this does not take shape until later. It is preceded by a certain musical mood, which is followed in my case by the poetic idea."—reference to a letter from Friedrich Schiller to Johann Wolfgang Goethe of 18 March 1796 (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 29-30).

[7] Nietzsche proposes an example of „socratic" art of tragedy with reference to the reforms and interventions by Euripides, including the repositioning of the actors, the altered role of the Chorus and the change in emphasis of characters. For more, see Nietzsche (1999, pp. 69).

(Nietzsche, 1999, p. 43), as nature taking place (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 120) as only then does it in fact attain the possibility of being art. In addition, Dyonisian art should be experienced by human beings in the same way as an omnipotent creator experiences the world he created; art as a product of our activity, as „we" are a product of the Gods. The transgression into the Dyonisian is thus ultimately one of a suspension of perspective. The famous phrase that „only as an *aesthetic phenomenon* is existence and the world eternally *justified*" (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 33) may, depending on the perspective undertaken, refer to *any* phenomenon—not only to musical ones.

4. Obstructions to musicking

We can now attempt to articulate the mutual qualities of the „event" of music as understood by Nietzsche and Small. They can be tentatively summarized in the following way: „musicking", outside of any concept about itself requires a *present* subject whose immersion includes both a spatial and temporal presence. This subject experiences phenomena of the event as affected by the processual „musical" reality. For Nietzsche, it is the addition of a primordial driving force of the Dyonisian that enables the shape-forming of the event to occurr in the first place. When the Dyonisian is supplemented with the Apollonian image, a domain of art has emerged. Musical phenomena and musical possibilities, when experienced in the event, go hand in hand. We do not encounter phenomena of music and the possibilities of music separately, but as inseperable from one another.

Whereas Small implicitly attempts to relieve music of this shape-forming predetermined requirement, Nietzsche never relinquishes the structure-forming quality of the Apollonian, neither „during" art nor „after" music. This is why any split between Being as Apollonian and Becoming as Dyonisian should not to be understood as related to a separation from one another, nor as different criteria for aesthetic judgment of „beauty" or „truth". Reformulating the term „music" into a verb, even though originally done with the intention of suspending idealist criteria, fails to remove them, but revises the static with the processual one; yet by maintaining the underlying position of a „before" and „after" music, it introduces a categorical differentiation between the two separate forms of existences. Be it as „play" alone or „play" *of* music, it requires the two to be adequately articulated for pointing to the difference between the two.

Here, I would like to suggest several additional points of contention between Small and Nietzsche with regards to the „event" of music or „musicking" that might help illuminate the nature of musicking further, but also point to some emerging methodological opportunities.

5. Articulating the event

As mentioned earlier, the Dyonisian suspension is one of a shift in perspective, an altered form of experience for the existing Self. This altered form infers that a musicking event may be observed from two perspectives, namely, from *without* and *within* the event. As explained earlier, while the former engages the event critically through reflective individuations (documentations, historical writings etc.), the latter involves a participation in it *while* it is taking place, during which the outlook on already familiar concepts is perpetually formed and re-formed through an immediate awareness[8]. Even if we know the following modulation in a familiar musical piece, we are perpetually under a tension of anticipation and reflection of what happens next. Both imply a „what" to refer to, the former through an Apollonian negation which perpetually alters itself with every new interpretation, and the latter that ongoingly negates the negation *during* its own constitution (Hasty, 2010). We might recognize a sound or a song „as" *such and such*; in addition, even after its having passed, we can recollect and reproduce it in our memory where even the same sound or a song attains a *new „as" such and such*; but any ongoing, immersive engagement with it, even if repeated in seemingly identical form, will constantly present it as *new*, and thus as unfathomable and unpredictable (Grüny, 2014, p. 256).

On the other hand, this also applies to the *without* of the event as well, as the nature of the given concept will also change through history. The meaning of both will prove to be perpetually elusive and dependent unconditionally on the *new situation* in which they are experienced. During the event, the singular „what" of the auditive, dancing or any immersive surrounding is perpetually denied of its „what", not only with regards to being *true*, but also as a „what" of absolute totality or a finite concept of value—it may imply it, but would require a perpetual reflective reexamination of its own individuation. In reflecting on a musical creation, we will only continuously reinterpret and reexamine it, without ever aquiring a possibility of examining it from all possible perspectives at once, neither spatially nor temporally; neither everywhere, nor simultaneously. Any individuation of the Self is shattered by the very nature of the event it is immersed in; it no longer acts as a contemplative subject that observes phenomena by virtue of being a subjectively formed „I" but one that constitutes and interacts with the phenomena without consciousness of itself „as" a subject. The „I" perpetually encounters the new, and this encounter itself *is* its thought.

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[8] The unattainable nature of the music phenomenon with relation to the structures of anticipation and memory and the inferred impossibility of rationality is what Christopher Hasty explains with "the image of thought"; see Hasty (2010).

Yet here we encounter a problem: despite the fluxus of the encounter and its perpetually incomplete iterations, what is the „I" left with if the concept of „music" is disregarded? Can the „what" of music be rid of its „what"? How is music (or musicking) „within" the event to be delineated from its qualifications „as" music (or musicking) „without" the event? If I am aware that the music ended and am now reflecting on it, this awareness is not just an awareness of presence, but also of the absence of what just came to pass during musicking. The nature of presence „present" and the subsequent presence „absent" is, despite formal similarities, not identical. My reflection is a reflection of something that continues to exist in its own way, giving a possibility of reflection in the aftermath. Thus, while the reflective account *without* is one that always alters itself through „mental" objects—the one „within" the event implies a „pure" immediacy that, at the very least, „suspends" with the existence of mental objects. It, in fact, observes their emergence. While the one from „without" may invite itself to the famous justification „as" an aesthetic phenomenon, the one „within" can only be observed in its varying forms of appearances „as" phenomena and the ways they are encountered in. Small's „Musicking" might thus be read as an attempted utilization of an evaluative working tool for a critique of a musical tradition by observing the emergence of its most obvious interrelations and regulations, with a case study of the symphonic orchestra.

Yet, when understood literally, it follows that if anything is to be perceived as musicking, it becomes so based on the activity and the event during which it emerges. This could quite literally mean that *anything* can be perceived as musicking—even the most silent, still phenomena devoid of all cultural content that may, according to some criterion of activity, be denoted to have music emerge. This is why an emergence out of the uncontained, participative and corporeally submerging Dyonisian is, for Nietzsche, crucial for the existence of tragedy[9]. It is out of the eventful, Dyonisian fluxus that, for example, the Chorus emerges for the purpose of recognizing the nature of the fluxus. The relevance of the Chorus is further supported through referencing the Euripidean paradigm, as it was exactly the displacement of the Chorus to the opposite of the stage that diminished its role in the eventful constellation of participants (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 63). The introduction of this juxtaposition, however, of the early and the latter Chorus in the Nietzschean tragedy is a transition from participation into one of reflection: The participation of the Chorus was gradually transformed into *spectatorship*; an audience that no longer *encounters* through the „rush", but witnessees its own Euripidean mirrored im-

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[9] To account for this, Nietzsche refers to the example of the tragic Chorus: tragedy initially consisted of „nothing but the Chorus", one out of which tragedy itself emerged as aesthetically „real" and present (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 36). This also includes a somewhat spontaneous and unscripted—even improvised separation of the group into a distinct, individuated entity participating in the tragedy.

age on stage (Nietzsche, 1999, pp. 55-56). Tragedy ceased to be immersive and was supplemented by criticism; it now lies outside the inherently Dyonisian „musical" mood of the event and positions the articulation of its intricacies as its priority. Be it „music" or „musicking", they both stem from the same core, and not one of „music"—but one of articulated memory and language that explains it. If that were the case, then we are left with criticizing our own articulation of both, or with suspending with the existence of music alltogether.

6. Ethics and the event

A practical aspect often overlooked when engaging music through „works" as autonomous objects is the variety of possible musical situations they might emerge in—be it willing or unwilling ones. If I am listening to Beethovens „Appassionata" performed by Daniil Trifonov in the Old Opera in Frankfurt, it is not the same as when I am listening to the same performance via an audiovisual reproduction in my apartment; furthermore, something entirely different takes place when a neighbour in the apartment next door is listening to the same performance through intrusive loudspeakers. In the first example, I am experiencing it „as" performance; in the second „as" entertainment and in the last one I experience it „as" an obstruction. All three are different, yet attached to an identifiable object that alters itself by means of where and when it is experienced: it ceases to be experienced „as" a musical work and instead transforms substantially into a social practice, one suitable for an appropriation for my own enjoyment, but also a nuisance dissallowing me to escape it. The same music work not only appears as present, but does so in vastly opposed ways, from fully controlled, benevolent ones to those of violence and instrumentalization. Already Kant accounted for this quality of music as its „lack in urbanity" (Kant, 1995, p. 269); yet, aspects such as violence, torture, war and death are often reduced to an interpretation of musical content of operas, performance practices, artistic statements; cultural practices implying consent of reception and „objectifying" violence, transfiguring it into an object of critique as well. However, the invasiveness of music that reconfigures the experience of itself is most evident in the borderline cases, with „works" being instrumentalized for mobilizing purposes (Baker, 2013; Cobussen & Nielsen, 2012), as well as for violent uses of psychological torture and physical submission (Grüny, 2011; Grant, Papaeti, & Leder, 2015; Papaeti, 2020).

Here, „musicking" confronts our own ethical presuppositions about music. Asked more directly: is torture with music also a kind of „musicking"? The fundamental difference between torture and anything we might consider a normal musical immersion is that it is imposed and can not be escaped; its auditive potentiality is however a common ground for both instances. For any music conventionally considered to be „art" to appear truly invasive, it's not the suggested object that is „altered" in relation to an ideal configuration of

itself during a performance. While listening to it on my own terms, I implicitly know I can always step outside of the concert hall or press the „pause" button on my walkman; this is a fundamental disposition of my own self preceding the experience I am encountering in the first place. Value judgments do, as Small claims, come later, but they need to include not only benevolence in practice, but also the potentially inductive qualities of harm. Musicking needs to examine its implicit mechanisms of control in similar ways that Becoming and Being come into a tension with one another.

This is why, for Nietzsche, the underlying principle of the Dyonisian is initially a non-moral one, but one that enables it to „be" whatever it is configured as in the spatiotemporal personal constellation of the event. In case of the sonata resonating from the neighbour's loudspeakers, the inevitability of the situation in which this might ocurr constructs out of the chaotic Becoming a Being of torture, something that we may in retrospect succeed in formulating, but will constantly need to reevaluate. However, if abstracted from its mechanisms of use and appearance, the Dyonisian or, arguably even music itself acts as a category lying outside of the ethical domain: it may appear artistically, but also barbarically[10].

 Small's definition of musicking goes as follows: „To music is to take part, in any capacity, in a musical performance, whether by performing, by listening, by rehearsing or practicing, by providing material for performance (what is called composing), or by dancing." Following this definition, he adds: "We might at times even extend its meaning to what the person is doing who takes the tickets (…) or the hefty men who shift the piano and the drums or the roadies who set up the instruments (…) or the cleaners who clean up after everyone else has gone. *They, too, are all contributing to the nature of the event that is a musical performance*" (Small, 1998, p. 9, cursive by the author). The issue emerges with the mention of the „*contributing*" activity, implying at least a minimal awareness of the kind of event in question. Just as the roadies setting up the instruments, the torturers are always well aware of the kind of music they are using, along with the exact way they are using it. Does their knowing of the exemplifications, of the „what" or of the way they will use it imply that they are also „musicking"? Simultaneously, would the same apply to the person being tortured as also „musicking"? We have something considered to be music used by torturers who also consider the sound they utilize to be music, but the person tortured, even if the music in question is culturally familiar, after having listened to songs uninterruptedly for hours, will most probably not consider it music in a general sense. With violence, a given concept of music is

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[10] What is suggested is a displacement of music with reference to its phenomenality alone into a domain outside of moral interpretations: Nietzsche (1999, p. 27) and Young (1994, Notes 35-8, Nr. 10, p. 156).

always overruled by obstructive ones in use during the event, through which fundamental musicological questions about the nature of both of these practices arise.

One particular kind of musicking might emanate for one person in one way, and for the other in a completely different one. The same applies to the „activity" within this music. Accordingly, Nietzsche emphasises the common Dyonisian „ecstasy" of the participants, for it, in effect, in addition to suspending rationality, captivates all those participating. That's why the Dyonisian shouldn't be understood as a purely „artistic" drive that creates its own kind of Dyonisian art in isolation. Music, whatever it may be, itself *is* a part of an underlying non-moral principle for the „true creator of art" who submits the spectacle to himself for himself (Nietzsche, 1999, pp. 32-33). For one such creator, everything—*even torture*—is an aesthetic phenomenon (also compared with the child drawing figures in the sand: Nietzsche, 1999, p. 114). For one immersed in it however, any understanding doesn't depend on the object at all, but on the situation in question and the way this object is „played" with. It inevitably involves a moral interpretation of the world by the fact that an encounter of the incomprehensible Becoming requires an inherently moral, causal interpretation for us to comprehend it at all (Small, 2010, p. 42). The explanation of the Being of music implies a possibility of plurality, suggesting „multiple" Beings for each of the participants. It follows that only within a commonly recognized practical context, some event may itself be „music"— this reaches the limit when we attempt a critique of the discourse determined by its own implied boundaries. Conclusively, the recognized context would do little to help with a convincing statement of *something* being the action of „musicking", applicable both to loud neighbours, as well as torture.

7. Temporality and the event

The Western musical tradition has produced a highly sophisticated system of notation of temporal events, including a system of signs for dictated relative duration (note lengths, bars, agogical instructions, tempo instructions at the beginning of pieces etc). Notation, even though it does provide a reliable visual representation of temporal structures, does little to account for a potentially „perfect" rendition, but must instead be understood as a blueprint—even for one such „perfect" rendition. If on the other hand, the performance is reproduced by means of a mechancal reproduction, a single participating person will, despite its near identically reproduced temporal rendition, encounter it in inevitably different ways every time, with different moods, inclinements, and, correspondingly, different reflections; all of which

effectively alter every single interpretation of experience. A documented temporal blueprint is to be „*interpreted*" or continuously re-read by a performer[11].

Despite the development of its precision, notation can not always do justice to accounting for the unpredictability of the event. The temporal aspect of a musical event is fundamentally different depending on the situatedness of subjective dispositions encountering it. If I am performing a piece for an acoustic guitar, it makes a big difference how anyone present, myself included, is „musicking" depending on the location (outdoors, church, concert hall, room, hallway etc.), on the acoustical parameters (resonance via sound system or via the instrument alone) and on the occasion alone (political event, musical competition, entertainment with friends). All the named situations further affect the personal dispositions and moods of those present (such as boredom, anxiety, fear, excitement etc.) that in turn radically alter the qualitative experience of music. Any mapped out schemata of temporality may be used as reference for a criterium of the performance (as is often the case in the West), but something is always left out concerning the musical „event" in its pre-reflective immediacy. An indication for this is the experience of time.

In his Basel lectures, Nietzsche interpreted the possibility of experiencing time as emerging due to a fundamental impossibility of human grasping of Becoming; as fluxus indivisible into points and without a beginning nor end. What one such reduction provides us with is a static relative point for further observing and measuring other points that, when connected, infer a Becoming. It follows that comprehending one such absolute continuum is impossible other than through a perceived „succession" appearing „as" time (Small, 2010, p. 39). Nietzsche understands the very concept of Being as one inevitably flawed way of perceiving the world due to moralist interpretations of the world through „cause and effect" due to gaps in the human mind that we constantly aim to fill by explaining. To counter this rational understanding emerges *conflict* as the inevitable driving force that itself *takes* time, transgressing the moral explanation of causality with one where „achievements emerge, and not a permanent victory over the other" (Small, 2010, p. 40.

An observable structure that Nietzsche refers to both in his Basel lectures and in *The Birth of Tragedy* is *rhythm*. Though contained in music, its general vitality serves as a mapping of phenomena and enables a distanced perception of them. Unlike time as is its foundation, rhythm is understood as an extensive magnitude to be comprehended through time and space as „ideally present" (Nietzsche, 1963). However, despite an explicit understanding of rhythm through succession or continuity, in Nietzsche's understanding, rhythm is

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[11] Andreas Haug shows how performative practices of interpretation emerged in correlation to Christian scriptures being "read" rather than "sung". The intensity, bodily presence and performativity entered a new set of relations within the event, particularly in the context of religious rituals. For more, see: Haug, 2021, pp. 370-391.

experienced as an *intensity*, grounded in the principle of perceived motions and rests that themselves aren't outside of Becoming but present gaps in our perception of time, ultimately also contained in rhythm. Summarized by Robin Small: „Rhythm is the schema that turns becoming into time. Thus, time is understood from the start as an aesthetic phenomenon" (Small, 2010, p. 50).

The cohesion of Dyonisian and the Apollonian thus points to a drive based in conflict and intensity in relation to the immediate experience of temporality. On the one hand, the personal disposition, in addition to being already formed prior to experiencing the situation, is on a constant forward moving trajectory through „confronting" the Becoming. For a Self, the entirety of its past experience takes part in determining the „what" of any phenomenon being experienced „now"; the perpetually redetermined present, momentary experience provides the supplement to this determination, as a formalization of Becoming into a comprehensive form of Being. The Being of Becoming never ceases to be, nor the other way around. Thus, it is also within „musicking" that the disposition is perpetually updated and directed towards the future through conflict in the most immediately perceived way. Such directedness is mapped out as succession and rhythm (Apollonian), but unmistakebly perpetually „rushes" further (Dyonisian). Thus, we may argue, the act of „musicking", occurrs through an emergence of Apollonian form and all its Dyonisian interruptions and breaks.

Even though such an understanding may hint at the way the „musical" emerges, it also more broadly relates to the nature of existence itself. The very impossibility of reconcilliation between the infathomable absolute Becoming and the conceptual idealism of Being can be understood as an underlying philosophical premise of both Small's musicking and Nietzsche's tragedy. In fact, the redemptive power of tragedy only emerges due to the detriment of never perceiving Becoming completely, but only fragmentally (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 25). The fact that music is based in time is not just a structural quality of it, but something that music, tragedy, or even art itself is required to redeem for those encountering it [12]. Any examination of „musicking" as a temporally moving event can not only describe and determine the nature of all acters and their activities or dispositions alone, but also establish the kernel of artistic conflict that temporally structures the artistic situation in existence. In order to truly determine what „musicking" is, we have to examine its emergence *through* conflict and how it exactly detaches itself from chaos of Becoming into a situation perceivable for us.

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[12] The problem of „aesthetic" redemption was undertaken by Julian Young (1994).

8. Conclusion

We have established three points of contention for musicking: critical stance, ethical limits and temporal immediacy. Accordingly, a fundamental question emerges: what conflict is music philosophy to pursue? Where is the hidden limit of the object of study for musicology? For Small, the entirety of a temporal, rhythmical, or better yet *any* such structuralized view is already predetermined by the „what" that it encompasses and thus potentially fails to recognize in its own inherent errors and contradictions. It risks insufficient evaluation of its own starting position of interpretation, but shrouds the emergence of the event as a cultural construct; the substantive being transformed into a processual verb does little to alter that. Small's individuation of Musicking is not itself inadequate, but potentially insufficient. By implying the nature of Becoming that is, from his perspective, neglected in musicology, he strives to set up an isolated criterium *for that* Becoming—one that has form, before the form even might have emerged from it. The attempt to avoid the „trap of reification" (Small, 1998, p. 2) comes close to actually being a reification of „musicking" itself as an activity with adequate, implicit musical properties. In reformulating the Being into a Becoming, Small potentially places himself in a problem pointed out by Christian Grüny, where the latter doesn't obviously function without the former, as any such activity presupposes an elementary musicological criterium of itself (Grüny, 2021).

This however, opens room for a more direct criticism of fundamental premises of any concept of „music". A science of music risks potentially appropriating other musical practices that do not adequately adapt to its own criteria. In any question it raises, it seeks out what it already implied prior. This has historically been a point of contest in science and academia regarding many musical practices if they not conform to the literate and practical exclusivity of the Western classical music, as in the case of popular music (Johnson & Cloonan, 2008); but also to religious music (Haug, 2016; Holsinger, 2001), to only name a few. With the economically charged historical emergence of the „work", the economical position of the „artist" followed (Goehr, 1992), as well as a substantial body of documentation. Musicology started engaging with the historical material that it had at its disposal, consistently reinterpreting and adjusting its own interpretations of music. The fundamental premise that Small is challenging is not by attempting to solve it by its own philosophical standards, but to circumvent the issue alltogether.

Despite proposing a transgressive leap from a conceptual into a processual understanding of music by pertaining to the aspect of activity, „musicking" as suggested by Small falls short of sufficiently clarifying the relationship between this activity and those doing it. Despite claiming the opposite, by bracketing its cultural points of reference, he failed to bracket the crucial premise—one that there is such a thing as *music* to speak of. In attempting to suspend with the constraints of a static, ideal understanding of music, he placed the activity itself

in a sphere where a number of criteria are left unconsidered, other than those possessing an implicitly recognized musical quality. It thus questions even the activity-based event from one „scientific" perspective, placing the demand for evaluative criteria within structural boundaries—something Small claims to be the perpetual intrusion in defining music. As soon as he attempts to position the activity as based in the agency of present conscious subjects *alone*, the understanding of the aesthetic situation it requires becomes critically, ethically and phenomenologically problematic. Even though the claim is that one single cultural construct has its own underlying premises, it remains indetermined as to how those same premises emerge to begin with. To use Nietzschean terminology: his underlying theoretical objective is to treat the Dyonisian processuality with a forescribed Apollonian framework; yet, in doing so, he limited himself to activity of music the interpretation of which is already determined.

Nietzsche's interest lies in reevaluating those exact underlying premises through a sceptical stance towards culture as such (a part of the broader philosophical development too broad for the scope of this paper). In *Birth of Tragedy*, the foundation for knowledge and existence is understood as lying in the perpetual „conflict" between the Apollonian and the Dyonisian drive. This conflict is the principle, the creative immediacy out of which everything, life, art, culture etc, emerges. The Dyonisian could be considered to be more „musical" than the Apollonian due to the phenomenal attachment of music to all phenomena, but the activity itself should not be understood as determined by the Dyonisian alone. The Apollonian individuation should also not be exclusively understood as descriptive of a quality or a particular kind of music, but as relating to the human agency that interacts with the Dyonisian. Through one such interaction, music attains a temporal dimension that makes, not only music, but time itself directly accessible to us.

We should, however, retain a dose of naïveté and keep in mind that „Musicking" was not intended to provide an undisputable alternative, but to provoke standardized scientific and cultural concepts in musicology through reversing the definitional approach. We are required to examine the event or the „musical" situation in which something emerges without looking to establish a definitive framework of how something is or is not art, but to in fact explain how one such framework emerges and „becomes" art. Small´s suggestion should be understood as an experimental framework for musicology to be further developed on a philosophical and systematic ground. This, however, is not to be done with reverting to concepts as fixed scientific units, but with establishing how such concepts enter a „conflict" with our own conceptually determined understanding of them. We need to examine the borders, fringes and categorical obscurities of music in order to expand the limit of Small's „musicking" into what all sciences need to explore—into uncharted territory.

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Nikola Vasilijević is a PhD candidate in musicology at Goethe University in Frankfurt. He studied Piano and Pedagogy in Linz, Austria, followed by a Master's program in Aesthetics in Frankfurt, Germany. As a scholarship holder of the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation in Germany, he is currently doing his PhD research on "Genealogy of music" by examining the boundaries of music as an artistic practice. He is also experienced as a classical and pop-musician, producer, teacher and archivist.