Being and Becoming of Music: Limits of Thought and Practice

Abstract

According to musicologist Christopher Small, the treatment of music in musicology carries fundamentally flawed historical premises. Instead of focusing on music through art „objects“, anything understood as „music“ should be examined on the grounds of its spatiotemporal appearance, as a social activity of musicking and the unfolding event. The emphasis of the verb „musicking“ instead of the substantive „music“ signifies a reinterpretation of a static into a processual concept. According to Small, musical meaning is formed with regards to the time and space of the immersive situation and the bodily encounter of participating individuals. This processual intervention over existing musical concepts through reinterpretation as „musicking“ opens the door to a broader philosophical scope. In order to approach two seemingly opposed interpretations of the subject matter mentioned above, I will attempt a reinterpretation of Small with reference to Arthur Schopenhauer’s concept of the „Will“, but with a more detailed emphasis on the expanded principle of the „Dyonisian“ and „Apollonian“ as suggested by Friedrich Nietzsche. I will further suggest some criteria for interpretation of any potential „musicking“ through several points of contention between Small’s musicology and Nietzsche’s philosophy. For this, I will utilize Nietzsche’s philosophical opposition between Being and Becoming serving as foundations of knowledge and art. The suggestion is that, while the entanglement of the Apollonian „image“ and the Dyonisian „rush“ enables the emergence of music as art, the foundation of Small’s „musicking“ lies in the non-ethical character of the Dyonisian—in what lies „behind“ the phenomenon and conceptualization of it. This ultimately questions the implication of music „as“ art, as it suggests that any justification thereof can not be considered outside of the subjective disposition encountering the event, nor beyond the individual disposition emerging within it. „Musicking“ doesn’t emerge with any cultural, social, symbolic or teleological purpose, but attains any one of these as soon as it’s designated „as-such“ by those principles that enable the concept to emerge in the first place. This, despite its broadly influential treatise, ultimately reveals the limits of Small’s „musicking“.